Welcome back to this episode of God News. Again, as will be the case going forward, this article is taken from the book, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Thought

by Dallas M. Roark, Ph.D. Most of what you are reading comes directly from that book with my thoughts added when necessary. This blog will deal with the Teleological Argument.

Teleological Argument

This argument is based upon purpose, or teleology, in the world. Sometimes called the argument from design, it would be better named as the argument to design, or a Designer. Wikipedia defines Teleology as “a reason or explanation for something as a function of its end, purpose, or goal, as opposed to as a function of, say, its cause. A purpose that is imposed by a human use, such as that of a fork, is called extrinsic”. Wikipedia Possibly more popular than some of the other arguments, it has appealed to scientific knowledge for its support. Aquinas wrote: “We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end. . . . Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move toward an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence. . . . Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this being we call God.“ 1

This argument is applied by its advocates to the microcosm, the cosmos, and the macrocosm. The snow flake and the blood cell are two examples of a microcosm that illustrate intricate design. It is not enough to speak of the snowflake, but one must go on to speak of the seeming design of man’s habitation whirling through space, turning on its axis at one thousand miles per hour. A speed of one hundred miles per hour would make the nights too long and the days too hot so that the earth would alternately freeze and burn. Such lower speed would make the nights roughly 250 hours long and the days the same. The earth’s proximity to the sun is such that it is at the right distance to secure enough heat but not overheat. The proximity of the moon to the earth is such that it keeps the oceans from inundating the land mass twice a day. A thinner atmosphere would allow meteors to bombard the earth. In the cosmos of man’s experience and being the eye has been singled out as an amazing illustration. The retina alone has 144 million separate entities in it. The eye appears as something designed, not as a result of chance, or slow development. If it developed over a long period of time there is no reason why each part stayed in existence until the other necessary parts were developed. It does not appear the result of a sudden mutation. The conclusion is reached that it has been designed by a designer. The basic conclusion is that a designer brought this into being, and in Aquinas’ words, this being is God.

We must now look at the criticisms of the argument to a designer. The most perceptive critic of the argument in the history of philosophy is David Hume, in the eighteenth century. Antony Flew follows much of Hume’s thought in the twentieth century. Hume raised the following objections.

(1) An infinite designer cannot be concluded from a finite design. To put it another way, “Similar causes prove similar effects and similar effects similar causes.”2 The intent of the criticism is well-taken, but there is a sense in which the precept could be modified in terms of modern physics. The principle concerning the loss of energy in nature would require a greater cause to achieve the lesser effect. Such a conclusion would require a greater being to create the world than the effects, but even this would not require an infinite God. In fairness, however, to Aquinas, the argument only speaks of God whose infinity is not learned from this argument as from the third argument, and then it would be possible to appeal to God’s self-revelation for the idea of infinity. Even Hume admits that the argument may give basis for concluding for a being who has a certain measure of power and intelligence.

(2) The second objection–Hume argued that the world may be compared more truly to a vegetable or animal rather than a watch or a machine.3 Regardless of either of these models, they all indicate design. If the world is a vegetable, it is an unusual vegetable that has design manifested in its being. The same would hold true for an animal. There is nothing sacred and necessary about the analogy of a machine. The makeup of both animal and vegetable is both complex and genetically designed. Neither of these models serves to get to an infinite or eternal solution if our physics concerning the origin of the earth is at all meaningful. Hume’s analogies in his objection are outdated. What we know about genetics and physics is light years ahead of what Hume knew in his day.

(3) Hume rejected the idea of a necessary existent. “There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.”4 Speaking of the being of anything as a general term, there is the absolute necessity of conceiving something as necessary. Actually, there are two necessities. First, from Hume’s vantage there is the necessity of a necessary material world. This is Hume’s alternative to a necessary God. But even the world is not the only necessary if we rule out a Creator. There is, a more fundamental necessary that we cannot escape. We must conceive of the necessity of space. We can–granting our existence somehow–conceive of empty space without anything in it. We cannot conceive of absolute nothing–no-thing. Space is necessary. If space is necessary, why should it be unreasonable to think of God as necessary since matter as we think of it has a beginning. Actually Hume does not really base his entire case on this as he claimed. The real issues are that God cannot be seen, and the problem of evil. We will speak of these shortly. If my observations about space are correct, then Hume’s comments about a necessary existence as having no meaning are nonsense.5

(4) The real heart of Hume’s objection concerns the matter of chaos in a designed world. To put in another way, if this is a designed world, why do people suffer? Hume appealed to Epicurus’ old question and regarded it as unsolved. Summing up Epicurus, Hume wrote about evil and God: Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent? Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent? Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?6

Some options have been proposed to solve this issue before and after the time of Hume. Some, like Brightman, have argued that God is finite and good and is struggling to overcome evil and will do it. Others, as reflected in Christian Science and other pantheisms, regard evil as an illusion and there is only good in the world. Yet others, like Gordon H. Clark, argue that God is the cause of evil.7

A more important issue is to question the formulation of the question of Epicurus. In a similar fashion Edgar Brightman has asked: “Can one believe in a God who allows evil to exist?” The implication of the question is that God is good and powerful and must therefore put evil out of the way. But this turns God into a cosmic policeman who must–absolutely must–do something about the wrong that people do. It is seemingly alright if the wrong involves other people. But the question is also more important in this fashion: “Can one believe in a God who does not allow evil to exist? Neither Hume or anyone would survive if God did what they demanded of him–namely, not allow evil to exist.

This raises the question about the nature of the goodness of God. If God did judge as Hume requests, would God still be good? Presumably a God who judged would be bad. Either way God cannot win, and Hume cannot lose.

Is the goodness of God in his patience or in his swift judgement? Antony Flew used this analogy of a father and insisted that a father would do things that God doesn’t do. A father would heal his child who is sick and God as father does not. This story is touching and indicting, but there are other stories that suggest a hands-off situation more profound. A father loves his son, but for the son’s growing up he gives him more and more freedom to make mistakes for the son must be on his own. The growing freedom may involve hurt and even the risk of death and self-destruction, but a true father gives the son the freedom to be himself. It may even be the choice of the son to involve himself in activities that mean certain death. The protest of the father is of no avail. One may lock up a drug addict son and seek to return him to normalcy, but as soon as the son is out he defies everyone who cares for him and returns to his destructive activities. The father loves and seeks to help, but the son will have nothing of it. God is like this also and there is a true expression of “tough-love” in the earthly as well as the heavenly father. The father is happy when the son follows the path of goodness, righteousness and fellowship with him. The human father also grieves when his son goes wrong. Can the father meaningfully force the son to his ways? Obviously he has the power to do it–certainly God does–but will he use it? Really?

The problem of evil will not be solved in a syllogistic fashion as created by Hume or Brightman. It is too complex and difficult. Their options are limited and narrow minded as well as inadequate in seeking to solve the problem.. Any formulations of the problem will have to consider God’s patience, man’s freedom, and the wisdom of not using power or force.

A few miscellaneous comments are in order concerning other issues in Hume and Flew. One basic underlying issue is that God is not seen. Given the grudging admission of Hume “that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence”8 we still do not see this being, only the effects of such a one. This is not enough to erect anything on. It has no comparison to the matters of verification as in science.9

Flew’s formulation of the issue of God abounds in some unusual and unnecessary formulations which call forth unnecessary demands, and then just simple abuse against his opponents. Some examples may help. Flew seeks to define God as creator in a way that man has no freedom of will.10 He defined God as omnipotent with the implication that man has no freedom and the logical necessity that the problem of evil must be whipped. It is true that he quoted several creeds for support, but the idea of omnipotence is not necessarily true for Christian theology. More appropriately, God is able to achieve his will and purpose which permits freedom, evil, as well as redemption.

Another problem in Flew is his use of the term “universe” in which he wants to see a God who is outside of the universe. What does the universe mean? Is not Flew asking for a view of another universe. Is this required in any theology? A transcendent God is not outside the universe, but only He is not identified with any material of it. God is not the earth or sun, or the stars, although theism believes that he created them. God must be within the confines of space and in that sense God is not outside of the universe, but within it. While I might argue for the existence of God I would not want to define Him as being outside the universe as I understand the term. Another example of the abuse–not logic–of Flew is seen in his comment that Roman Catholics have more juvenile delinquents than anyone else.11

A missing element to the argument from design is that it does not include a basic tenet in the argument which is an affirmation of Christian faith; namely, the world in which we live is a “fallen” or sinful world Mankind has spoiled the world in so many ways in the past and continues to do the same thing. The argument seems to imply a perfect world.. Thus, the problem of evil is one of the greatest objections to the claim of design. In the world of the creatures it is argued that one beast devouring another for survival and food is a natural evil. The problem of evil in terms of sickness and disease is another feature. How does evil fit into purpose? In the matter of waste, what can be said for the desert or cragged mountains?

How does one reconcile the existence of evil with the goodness of God? Faced with the propositions that God is good and also all powerful, some have concluded that either God is not good or he is not all powerful, or both, because of the presence of evil in the world. Some, like Edgar Brightman, have argued that a finite god is struggling with evil and will eventually defeat it.

From the Christian perspective these are not the only alternatives. God is good, but he only does what he wills. “All-powerfulness” is used by critics to imply that God should abolish evil immediately if he is able. This is not a biblical view of God. Can it be that God has willed something else, something that involves a cosmic risk, something that will give rise to evil? Is not freedom a neglected concept? Although the problem of evil is difficult to understand, even with the rich concept of freedom, it is all the more difficult to understand without it. The limitation of the teleological argument is that it does not give room, or a basis, for understanding aberrations from teleology or goodness due to freedom. “The meaning of evil is linked with freedom. Without it, no theodicy is possible.” 12

Freedom is the presupposition of evil and sin. Freedom as a concept must be large enough to involve the world as we experience it in life’s heartaches 13 Such a “fallenness” of the creation and man is presupposed in the Scriptures (cf. Rom. 8; Gen.1-3 ) . The bondage of the creation under the power of demonic freedom may serve as a means of understanding evil or dysteleological facts in the world. Without freedom this sin would not be possible. Without sin some suffering of man would be unintelligible.

While freedom is necessary to explain the appearance of evil in the cosmic sense, and this is implied in the existence of the devil, freedom does not mean that man and evil are without limitations. On the other hand, because sin and evil are evident in the world, one must not conclude that man is as sinful as he can be, and the world is filled with evil as is could be. .

In conclusion, while the teleological argument does not recognize the existence of evil, the Christian faith affirms it as a basic problem of man and the world is a purposeful world. But the purposefulness of it is not the sole item in existence. While some things point to purpose, not everything does. The limitation of the argument for design may be seen in the statement of Pascal: “Nature has some perfections to show that she is the image of God, and some defects to show that she is only His image.”14

The next time I will share the argument of “Ontology”. Hope you come back.

Chapter I, part II